Comforting delusions? How to evaluate the plausibility of mystical-type insights in psychedelic experiences

Summary & key facts

This paper argues that mystical-type beliefs people report after psychedelic experiences — for example, feeling that reality is fundamentally loving — should not automatically be called delusional just because they conflict with naturalism. The author says naturalism is one metaphysical view among others and proposes 'metaphysical agnosticism' (remaining neutral between competing metaphysical theories). The paper also notes some mystical claims (like paranormal beliefs) can be problematic, and it says mystical experiences may be ineffable, so their verbal descriptions and conceptual labels should be treated cautiously. Finally, the paper considers what this stance means for psychedelic-assis

Key facts:

• The author defines naturalism as only one metaphysical position and argues it is not the only internally consistent view compatible with science.
• The paper proposes 'metaphysical agnosticism': we should not automatically judge psychedelic-facilitated metaphysical beliefs as delusional simply because they contradict naturalism.
• The author notes that some mystical-type beliefs include paranormal claims; metaphysical agnosticism does not extend to those, and they can be considered problematic.
• The paper argues there is no definite rational method to choose one metaphysical theory over others, which motivates remaining neutral among competing views.
• The author suggests mystical-type experiences may be ineffable and non-conceptual, so verbal or conceptual descriptions of them should be treated with caution rather than taken as definitive truth.
• The paper discusses implications of metaphysical agnosticism for psychedelic-assisted therapy but does not present empirical clinical results in this abstract.

Abstract

Psychedelics can facilitate mystical-type insights and beliefs, such as the belief that the fundamental nature of reality is loving consciousness. These belief changes could underlie the positive effects of psychedelics on wellbeing. However, mystical-type beliefs have been criticized of being delusional, as they contradict naturalism. Here I argue that naturalism is one metaphysical position among several competing ones. There is no definite way of choosing one metaphysical theory over others, as there are several metaphysical positions that are internally consistent and compatible with scientific knowledge. This calls for metaphysical agnosticism, which entails that psychedelic-facilitated metaphysical beliefs cannot be considered as delusional simply if they contradict naturalism. However, the challenge is to distinguish between beliefs that are strictly metaphysical and other mystical-type beliefs, which can include, for example, paranormal beliefs. Metaphysical agnosticism does not apply to the latter and they can be considered as problematic. I apply metaphysical agnosticism to evaluate mystical-type belief changes associated with the use of psychedelics, as indicated by empirical research. I consider the possibility that mystical-type beliefs are ineffable and non-conceptual, which entails that we should not take conceptualizations of them too seriously. I conclude by discussing the implications of metaphysical agnosticism for psychedelic-assisted therapy.

Topics

Complementary and Alternative Medicine Studies Olfactory and Sensory Function Studies Psychedelics and Drug Studies

Categories

Clinical Psychology Psychology Social Sciences

Tags

Agnosticism Alternative medicine Consciousness Epistemology Medicine Metaphysics Mysticism Naturalism Paranormal Pathology Philosophy Psychology Theology